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MAKING SENSE OF EXTREMISM IN THE BOSNIAN 
FOOTBALL TERRACES: AN INITIAL ANALYSIS
Abstract: This paper presents an initial assessment of the results of a four 
month research project studying the Ultras1 groups in BiH. This research con-
tributed to the Bosnia & Herzegovina Resilience Initiative (BHRI) Programme 
(implemented by the International Organization for Migration -United Na-
tions, funded and closely coordinated with the U.S. Agency for International 
Development - USAID) aiming to reduce the threat of violent extremism in 
BiH and to counter extremist efforts to deepen or exploit community tensions.
Keywords: Ultras, BiH, football, Extremism, public security.
1. Introduction
The last 18 years have witnessed a dynamic and significant development 
of radicalisation linked to religious and political polarisation and extremism 
throughout Europe. Hence, studying and preventing radicalisation has become 
a European and global priority. As the European Commission2 acknowledges, 
radicalisation is a complex and dynamic phenomenon involving people em-
1 This report uses the terms Ultras and not hooligan because the participants define 
themselves as such as they model their repertoire of actions according to Ultras groups 
in Europe such as the most notorious Italian Ultras. The term ultras – or ultrà – originates 
from the ultra-royalist French, indicating the most fanatical to golds of the White Terror in 
the years immediately following the French Revolution (Testa and Armstrong, 2010 a,b).
2 European Commission, Migration and Home Affairs, Prevention of radicalisation, Retrieved 
January 10, 2020, from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/crisis-
andh terrorism/radicalisation_en
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bracing extreme ideologies that can lead to the commitment of violence and 
ultimately terrorism. As human behaviour is influenced by the interaction it has 
with the environment, to understand radicalisation we must address its micro 
dimension (individual exposure), which must be studied concomitantly to the 
enabling environment of its meso (group domain) and macro (social space) 
dimensions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2007).
Bosnia and Herzegovina Social Space
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a country divided geographically and politi-
cally along ethnic and religious lines, a result of the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords 
that established the country as a tripartite state. The legacy of the ethnic and 
religious conflicts of the 1990s remains a key factor in Bosnia’s politics, society 
and engagement with the international community. This legacy continues to 
influence the narratives that fuse culture, religion, heritage and ethnicity in 
the formation of Bosnian identities, and serves as a key driver of difference and 
division.
In recent years, the BiH government has cited recruitment by international 
Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda as the greatest contemporary 
security threat, catalysed by ongoing conflicts in the Middle East. Since 2012, 
estimated 220-330 Bosnian foreign fighters have travelled to conflict zones in 
Iraq and Syria, with many have since returned (Beslin and Ignjatijević, 2017).
However, ethnic-religious tensions between Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian 
Serbs and Croats have not dissipated, with renewed concerns around far-right 
and ethno-nationalist movements that have typically not faced the same levels 
of scrutiny. Akin to the Islamist threat, across the Western Balkans these move-
ments have their roots in conflicts of the 1990s, and have also produced foreign 
fighters that have travelled to participate in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
In countries neighbouring BiH, such as Serbia and Croatia, there is often a 
lack of political will to tackle and condemn extremism due to a number of factors, 
from the broadly accepted incorporation of nationalism in state policies, to the 
tolerance of far-right organisations through strategic calculations of national 
interest. Despite the divergent nationalist agendas of far-right groups in Croatia 
and Serbia, they typically promote the self-determination or independence of 
the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and share a desire to create a Greater Croatia 
or Greater Serbia. For example, Serbian nationalists call for the unification of 
today’s Serbia with Bosnia’s Serb-dominated entity, Republika Srpska, and with 
parts of Croatia that were once dominated by Serbs.
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In Bosnia, far-right “Chetnik” groups (named after Serbo-Croat units within 
the former Yugoslav Army) rely mainly on the Ravna Gora movement, primarily 
based in the north-western town of Prijedor. Neo-Ustaše groups (the former 
Croatian fascist movement) in Bosnia are especially active in areas close to the 
border in Croatia, where ethnic incidents flare between the majority Croat po-
pulation and Bosnian Muslims.
Bosniaks do also have their own far-right or nationalist groups. The major-
ity are linked with radical Islamism, but in recent years new movements have 
also emerged, including the Bosnian Movement of National Pride (BPNP). The 
BPNP promote Bosniak identity and advocate for a secular Bosniak ethno-state, 
and have declared a range of minority groups as enemies of Bosnia, including 
Jewish people, Roma, Communists, gays and non-whites.
As would be expected, many of these groups have an extensive online presen-
ce, with a wealth of far-right extremist content available across a range of internet 
platforms, especially Facebook, but also Instagram and YouTube. Additionally, 
numerous websites are available across the Western Balkans promoting far-right 
groups, often linking to wider international far-right movements (Beslin, Ignjati-
jević: 2017). Content focuses on a wide range of issues to mobilise support, from 
anti-abortion and homophobic campaigns, to neo-fascism, ethnic supremacy and 
cultural homogeneity. For example, the Ravna Gora movement are active online, 
with their website achieving around 4,000 daily visits and an overall total of 3 
million visits, alongside a network of closed Facebook groups.
Amid this context, ethnic tensions are often expressed via football across 
the Western Balkans, and nationalist leaders and groups use football to further 
their goals. The Balkans has a long and tragic history of politics in the football 
stands; at the end the end of the 1980s, former Yugoslavian football experienced 
a progressive politicization. This trend should not surprise; Increasingly, Euro-
pean football terraces are becoming a ‘zona franca’ where violence, xenophobia, 
ethnic-chauvinism and religious prejudice are displayed (Testa, 2009; Spaaiji 
and Testa, 2016). Testa (2008) argues that the football stadium is a symbolic 
locale where extreme ideological narratives are promoted and through which 
the radicalisation of youth is given agency and carried outside the stadium. The 
emerging nationalist elites employed the sport as a basis for personal enrichment, 
construction of power at the local level and political self-legitimization in the 
eyes of their own national/ethnic groups.
This trend is evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with fights between groups 
of Ultras, mostly divided along ethnic lines, a typically low-level but regular 
occurrence. In a number of cases, however, violence has escalated, exacerbated 
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by the legacy of conflict. In 2015, the bus of the Siroki Brijeg youth team was 
attacked in Sarajevo, again involving hooligans associated with FK Zeljeznicar3. 
Similar tensions also exist in towns with mixed populations such as Mostar, 
where the rival Velez and Zrinjski clubs are supported by Bosniaks and Bosnian 
Croats respectively.
Because of the nature of extremist groups4, most studies on the link between 
extremism and football groups relies on ‘external’ observations of the groups’ 
behaviours, and secondary data mostly collected from the Internet via social 
media5. There is a lack of existing research on the Ultras that has utilised an 
in-depth ethnographic approach6, especially across the Western Balkans. This 
ethnographic study aimed to fill this gap in the study of extremist football fans 
groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The aim of the study was to use primary 
and secondary data gained from participant observation (both on and offline), 
semi-structured interviews, content analysis of documents, and from cutting-
edge online analysis tools to study the behavioural dynamics of involving Ultras 
in and out the BiH football terraces. 
2. Methodology
To fulfill the aims of this study, the research team interviewed all those in-
volved, namely representatives of the:
• Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Sarajevo Canton
• Sarajevo Canton police
• Republic of Srpska Ministry of the Interior
• Police Administration Banja Luka.
• Football Association of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Nogometni/Fudbalski 
Savez Bosne i Hercegovine (N/FSB&H);
3 Hooligan Attack Raises Ethnic Tensions in Bosnia, Balkan Transitional Justice, from 
March 16, 2015. Retieved January 12, 2020 from https://balkaninsight.com/2015/03/16/
hooligan-attack1 raises-ethnic-tensions-in-bosnia/
4 Fielding (1981) in his seminal study on the British National Front, details the challenges 
for a researcher in studying extremist groups objectively; while Testa (2009, 2010, 2012, 
2018) points out the risk inherent in interacting with them.
5 This also holds true for mainstream extremism especially Jihadist and Far-Right groups.
6 C. f Pearson, in Hobbs and May (2002, p. viii)
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• Football Association of Republika Srpska (Fudbalski savez Republike Srp-
ske)
• Football Club Široki Brijeg (Nogometni klub Široki Brijeg)
• HŠK Zrinjski Mostar (Hrvatski športski klub Zrinjski Mostar)
 • Football Club Željezničar (Fudbalski klub Željezničar Sarajevo)
• FK Velež Mostar (Fudbalski klubVelež Mostar)
• Škripari - NK Široki Brijeg
• Ultras - HŠK Zrinjski Mostar
• Lešinari - FK Borac Banja Luka
• Robijaši - NK Čelik Zenica
This study employed an ‘applied ethnographic’ approach. Applied ethno-
graphy has two main advantages; it has an explanatory dimension that seeks 
to develop knowledge that will be relevant for policy makers, practitioners and 
institutions, and other stakeholders seeking to address complex social issues. 
The second is that is readily applied to dynamic and contemporary real world 
problems; it will provide a specific framework for accessing data that enables in 
depth analysis and understanding of how individuals’ social world unfolds; how 
individuals makes sense of their decisions, how they feel about their (criminal) 
actions, how as a group interact with their internal and external environment 
(Pelto, 2013). 
The research team approach involved:
Accessing relevant Ultras groups via a network of key ‘gate-keepers’ (i.e. 
individuals linked directly to individuals who were active in the communities 
in question).
On the basis of this negotiated access, the researchers gathered data via fi-
eldwork from a variety of sources including direct interviews and observations 
and the internet.
Researchers gathered data on the culture, values, ideology of participants/
groups as well as their interactions with each other. To gather data, the team 
used triangulation. As the term suggests, this approach employed more than 
one method to collect information (Hobbs & May, 2002). 
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This study collected data through:
• Semi-structured interviews targeting groups members and key stakeholders 
in the football context (for instance representatives of the Football Association 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, clubs and the Police); 
• Fieldwork observations of the groups studied in and around a selection of 
relevant football fixtures in BiH;
• Documents analysis.
• Online analysis of Ultras groups, networks and their narratives.
Online Mapping & Analysis of Bosnian Ultras Groups
The online research was carried out by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue 
and it aimed to complement the offline research by determining the extent of 
online activity by Ultras groups in BiH and whether these groups have ties to 
ethno-nationalist violent extremism. The online research examined:
• The scale and extent of online activity;
• The platforms these groups use, how they use them and for what purposes;
• The types of content and narratives promoted by these groups.
This project used a mixed methodology drawing on qualitative and quan-
titative assessments of the online public activity of BiH Ultras groups through 
the use of social listening tools and ‘digital ethnographic’ research7. Based on 
an initial scoping exercise, the research focused on public social media activity 
on Facebook and YouTube, as well as a series of online forums used by Bosnian 
football fans and hooligan groups. Research for this project took the following 
steps:
1. Initial scoping of online platforms: To discover relevant online groups and 
communities ISD researchers used ‘snowball sampling’, starting from known 
Bosnian football supporter social media groups on popular platforms such as 
Facebook. Once an initial series of accounts and groups were identified, rese-
archers aimed to identify related groups and platforms to build a picture of the 
relevant online ecosystem.
7 For the purpose of this project public activity is understood to be content produced by 
par- ticular accounts or groups on social media which is readily available to researchers 
searching across a platform, or through that platforms API, and which does not require 
special permission to access (e.g. through a request to a closed group or chat channel).
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2. Mapping of identified Ultras groups and networks: Using our social liste-
ning tools we mapped the public social media presence of the identified groups, 
accounts and platforms. Based on our initial scoping, we decided to include:
a. Tracking group activity on Facebook using Crowd tangle. Crowd tangle 
data were queried through a quantitative analysis on the total volume of 
posts produced by these pages over time, and the levels of engagement 
with these posts including numbers of likes, shares and comments; and 
qualitative analysis on the topics of the most popular posts to identify the 
nature of engagement.
b. Tracking key accounts on YouTube. The research team identified up to 20 
YouTube accounts that are posting relevant content and gather data relat-
ing to the numbers of followers these YouTubers have and the numbers of 
views on their videos. We performed a qualitative analysis of their video 
content to identify trends over time.
c. From our initial scoping, we identified a number of more traditional 
online forums that appear to have been used by Bosnian football supporters 
and Ultras. Many of these forums were older, and appeared to be used less 
frequently, however we conducted a further review of these to understand 
the evolution of online activity over time. 
Data Analysis Strategy
The research team collated the data sources and conducted a preliminary 
thematic analysis; interview data were contrasted together with field observations 
and internet analysis to deliver the theoretical understanding of the research 
questions.
Section 1: Who and what are the Ultras in BiH and do 
they present a problem to the BiH authorities?
Explaining the Ultras in BiH is a complex task; this research suggests it is 
appropriate to understand them as a form of extremist group8. BiH authorities 
are struggling to tackle the groups’ criminal activity and to curb their violence 
in and outside the football stadia. Their dangerousness is explained by a recent 
violent episode; the 27th of September 2019 Radio Sarajevo was attacked, and 
8 Ultras are football fans groups who manifest extreme and organised displays of anti-
social behaviour and criminal activity which is often established in biases usually linked 
with the right-wing extremist scene (Cf. Spaaiji and Testa, 2016; Testa, 2013, 2018).
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several journalists were threatened by a group of Ultras of the Football Club 
Sarajevo9. Since the beginning of 2019, BH Journalists and the Free Media Help 
Line have registered five death threats and six physical assaults on journalists 
and media teams; the journalists lamented that the authorities were unable to 
stop these groups10.
There are a series of risk factors that explain the existence and appeal of the 
Ultras groups to the youth of BiH. Our research suggests that the first risk fac-
tor creating this threat is socio-environmental in nature and therefore needs to 
consider a wide range of issues. Ethnicity and ethnic tensions do appear to play 
a role, but we suggest this is not a primary issue in understanding the Ultras 
groups in BiH. It is true, though, that in a political milieu constructed on eth-
nic divisions and reciprocal discriminations, ethnic nationalism is understood 
by some as an antidote to poor social condition. It is exploited by the Ultras 
groups to justify their existence; the groups function as a catalyst of belonging 
in a politically fragmented country. Ethnic roots are also used by the Ultras as 
a narrative to single out and most often legitimise provocation to rival factions 
and in some cases violence.
However, our research suggests that the economic of BiH and in particular 
unemployment rate and concomitant under-utilisation of youth was a key factor 
identified by all stakeholders, including the Ultras groups them. Disenfranchised 
youth join these groups, which offer the possibility to gain power, tackle bore-
dom, discharge daily frustrations and, because of the prolific criminal activities 
of these groups, earning money. 
Our data suggest the environment (in particular the football stadium) is a 
key risk factor; in particular the poor stadium infrastructure, lack of stadium 
regulation, poor security arrangements and match attendances. As in East Euro-
pean countries, low attendances at football matches work as amplifier of Ultras’ 
actions and presence (Dzhekova et.al. 2015). In addition, the lack of football 
clubs security and of regulation inside the stadium means the Ultras groups 
can exert a very high level of control in the stadiums. As a result, the Ultras are 
perceived by youth and other fans as powerful. Their chants, banners, symbols 
9 In terms of criminal activities, the Maniacs (Manijaci supporters of the Football Club 
Željezničar) and Horde Zla (supporters of the FC Sarajevo) are deemed by all police forces 
interviewed as the most dangerous because criminal organisations. It is important to stress 
that both groups were the only one who denied at the last moment to meet the research 
team because of our questions focusing on criminal activities.
10 Bosnia Journalists Protest After Thugs Storm News Outlet, BalkanInsight, from September 
30, 2019, retrieved January 21, 2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2019/09/30/bosnia-
journalists3 protest-after-thugs-storm-news-outlet
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and physical intimidation are used to either recruit (fans join them because they 
are intimidated) or to eject those who oppose their presence and dominance. 
The second broad risk factor is political and can be identified in the Ultras’ 
narrative of a perceived corrupt political class which fails BiH youth and society 
around which the groups organise and recruit. In this case, the Ultras portray 
themselves as the only resistance group to the status quo. For example, all the 
groups declared their oppositions to local political parties who according to them 
have hijacked any societal arena including the police; in some cases, the groups 
acted as political/pressure agent to contrast local politics (Cf. Robijaši Zenica). Far 
right ideology was part of two groups collective identity11 but it did not appear 
to be sophisticated and strong like other European groups for instance those in 
Italy, Spain, Greece and some Eastern European groups such as in Poland and 
Bulgaria. This ideology feeds an “Ultras Mentality” which our research suggests 
is one of the main drivers to explain the group’s repertoire of actions. Important 
risk factors are also the sense of belonging/community and identity.
For example, being from Grbavica in Sarajevo enshrines an identity upon the 
everyday teenager of being a Manijac12. Local networks (family, friend groups, 
classmates) also amplify the chances that one joins an Ultras groups. Our data 
also stress risk factors such as the feeling of victimhood against journalists, the 
Federal State, local politicians and the police; love for the city and the football 
club; and the excitement of violence and Glory.
Section 2: Groups’ structure, Ultras Mentality, 
Criminal and Online activities
Section two of this paper analysis the Ultras groups structure, their collective 
habitus13 what we call the “Ultras Mentality”, which informs and explains their 
actions; their criminal activities and their online presence.
The structure of the groups can be described as a hub-and-spoke network; 
there are more leaders, and members have some authority. Power is in multiple 
11 Škripari - NK Široki Brijeg and Ultras - HŠK Zrinjski Mostar
12 Ultras supporting the Football Club Željezničar (Sarajevo)
13 French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu defines Habitus as “a subjective but not individual 
system of internalised structures, schemes of perception, conception, and action common 
to all members of the same group or class” These “internalised structures” and “schemes 
of perception” structure the subject’s (shared) world-view and their “apperception” of 
the world in which they suppose they exist (Bourdieu, 1977, p.86; Bourdieu, 1998 and 
Bourdieu and Wacquant, 2007).
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hands and there is a high level of functional diversity; in one group there were 
10 leaders. 
Leaders were those who were older and were perceived as charismatic figures, 
this is important to make sense of the radicalisation of newcomer’s process as 
they are those who promote changes in beliefs and behaviours and facilitate the 
adoption of the Ultras Mentality which justifies violence and their self-sacrifice 
if needed for their “people” (ethnic belonging) and the Ultras group.
Based on our data, the Ultras Mentality in BiH is constructed around four 
important elements:
Values: being an Ultras means living following the virtues of Loyalty, Hon-
our, celebrating “Balkans” masculinity, strength, unity and most importantly 
violence.
Anti-system stances against the perceived corrupt state and political class, 
against their armed “henchmen” the police, and against the Football Association 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina considered decadent and costly spending money 
on “fancy” buildings in Sarajevo but not investing in Stadium facilities and in 
promoting BiH youth talent in football.
Past and tradition: These fuels rivalries among groups and in BiH it is more 
important than ethnicity to explain Ultras violence.
Ethnic nationalism which in some groups was linked to Far-Right and Far-
Left ideologies. However, as explained earlier Ethnic nationalism does not explain 
the BiH Ultras existence; The BiH extremism is explained by localised power 
dynamics and the Ultras groups’ criminogenic needs.
To be part of the nucleus, it is necessary to show commitment and elitism 
(adhere to the values, ideology and tradition of the group) only in this case a 
member is co-opted. The Nucleus covers all the functions of the group from 
memberships, mural graffiti, banners, chanting, smuggle pyrotechnics and cri-
mes such as selling drugs.
The Ultras criminal Activities
Our research suggests that the Ultras phenomenon in BiH is not so much an 
issue of political or religious ‘extremism’ (Cf. ethnic nationalism, Far Right or 
Jihadist ideologies) but more about their criminogenic nature, status and needs 
within the political, social and economic geography of their local environment.
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Our data indicate that in BiH, Ultras groups exist fundamentally to make 
money from criminal activities particularly via drug dealing, racketeering, extor-
tions, intimidations and “services” offered to local politicians during the electoral 
period. Our data also highlight that in certain locales, levels of corruption exist 
that allow the Ultras groups to gain and exercise their power and control. This 
research suggests that crime and corruption were so intrinsically linked to the 
Ultras in BiH that one group regretted that it was relatively small in number 
because this was hindering their criminal opportunities and profits. This data 
highlights how a key driver for such groups is not ethnic or sectarian but relates 
directly to their capacity to operate as a semi-organised crime group within and 
sometimes beyond their locality.
Our data also point out that the organised criminality of those within Ultras 
groups is empowered through the connections between the Ultras Leaders and 
the Football clubs. Our data suggests that most of the groups receive financial 
payments from the football clubs to avoid creating problems.
The Ultras Online activity:
• There is a strong online presence of pages, channels and accounts associated 
with ultras groups. From our sample there are on average 31,431 users which 
follow ultras group related pages from BiH.
• In the course of this study we analysed engagement data with online pu-
blic Facebook pages associated with hooliganism in Bosnia over one year. This 
revealed over 4.7 million user interactions with posts in these groups over the 
year period, from 1.5 million users liking these pages, an 11% growth over the 
12-month period.
• Some of the uses for these groups include: sharing various types of news 
related to football, football news from the Balkans and BiH, news about their 
team; sharing general information and guidance for firm/groups members about 
games, strategic decisions, issues they have with the management of the club; 
selling merchandise; belittling opponents; sharing political messages; sharing 
content which glorifies the club.
• Over a dozen YouTube channels associated with Ultras in BiH had garnered 
nearly 15 million views, and almost 34,500 subscribers. These channels were 
largely associated with firms linked to specific football clubs, although there were 
channels that also championed broader (sub-)national groups, such as ‘Serbian 
Hooligans’ or ‘Bosnian ultras’, associated with nationalist ideologies.
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• Content on these YouTube channels was not explicitly violent, but domi-
nated by footage of crowds chanting to intimidate opposition, street marches 
by supporters’ groups with individual faces covered, and some scenes of street 
violence against fans from rival clubs, often including cutaways during clashes.
Section 3: The BiH State response and Research recommendations
• Our findings underline the importance of a coherent and systematic respon-
se in terms of policing, club security arrangements and new legislation. There 
are clear and obvious deficits in the responses among the authorities at a local 
level that need to be addressed at a Federal level to bring BiH up to international 
standards of policing and safety and security.
• Based on our data, we suggest the Ultras in BiH is an issue that must be 
addressed because of their associations with criminal activity and the manner 
in which their behaviour in football stadiums enables their power and influence 
to enact crime, including homophobic hate crimes.
• Greater levels of safety and security measures should be introduced both 
within and outside of football stadiums. Policing should be consistent in every 
Canton as disparity of treatment is a problem. For example, there were attempts 
by police forces notably the Sarajevo Canton police to harmonise in all Cantons 
the Law on Public Assembly and the Law on Violence and indecent behaviour at 
sport events but these attempts were proved difficult for the resistance of local 
cantons political authorities to transfer power to the Federal government. One 
of the main recommendations of the study is that a proposed federal law “On 
the Prevention of Violence and Misbehaviour at Sport Events” is considered 
and new national legislation created by the legislator at a Federal level as this 
will create the necessary legal framework for harmonisation at the canton level. 
This law also includes empowering Football Banning Orders and creating the 
necessary conditions for adequate safety and security both inside and outside 
football stadiums.
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SMISAO EKSTREMIZMA NA FUDBALSKIM 
TERENIMA BIH: INICIJALNA ANALIZA
Rezime
Ovaj rad predstavlja početnu procenu rezultata četvoromesečnog istraži- 
vačkog projekta koji proučava Ultrase u BiH. Ovo istraživanje je doprinelo 
programu Bosanskohercegovačke inicijative za otpornost (BHRI) (sprovodi ga 
Međunarodna organizacija za migracije-Ujedinjene nacije, a finansiralo i bliže 
koordinisano s Američkom agencijom za međunarodni razvoj - USAID) s ciljem 
da se smanji pretnja nasilnim ekstremizmom u BiH i suzbijanje ekstremističkih 
napora za produbljivanje ili iskorišćavanje komunalnih tenzija.
Ključne reči: Ultras, BiH, fudbal, navijačke grupe, javna sigurnost.
